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Abstract
In this paper, a Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) model of growth-inequality
relationships, with missing credit markets, knowledge spillover and self-employed
agents, is calibrated to New Zealand data. The model explains how two distinct
policy shocks involving redistribution and immigration imply, subsequently, two
completely opposite outcomes. Agents’ inability to borrow aggravates a negative
macroeconomic effect of heterogeneity on growth. Redistribution mitigates that
effect but creates microeconomic disincentives on saving and work-effort. Conse-
quently, immigration shocks that perturb variance of ef￿ciency induce a negative
growth-inequality relationship, while redistribution shocks, in New Zealand’s case,
produce larger ￿uctuations in incentives than in macro bene￿ts, implying a positive
growth-inequality relationship.
JEL classi￿cation: E24; E62; O11; O47
Keywords: Heterogeneous agents, externality, income inequality, growth, pro-
gressive redistribution.
￿Bandyopadhyay gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from the Vice-Chancellor’s Strategic Re-
search Development Fund at the University of Auckland and the PBRF Grant from the Economics Depart-
ment. Also, authors thank, without implicating, Professor Richard Rogerson for his comments on an earlier
draft of this paper at the 2007 Summer Institute of the NBER and the two anonymous referees for their
constructive suggestions. Contact address: Dept. of Economics, University of Auckland, 12 Grafton Road,
OGGB (Level 6), Auckland, New Zealand; e-mail: debasis@auckland.ac.nz.
yTang acknowledges the ￿nancial support of Developing Researcher Grant from the School of Account-
ing, Economics and Finance, Deakin University; valuable comments from the participants and, especially,
comments from Ian King, Chung Tran and Dean Corbae in Sydney-Melbourne Conference on Macro The-
ory, and proofreading assistance from Annette Lazonby. Contact address: 221 Burwood Highway, Bur-
wood, Victoria 3125, Australia. Email: xtang@deakin.edu.au
11 Introduction
"(A)carefulreassessmentoftherelationshipbetweenthesetwovariables(growthrateand
income inequality) needs further theoretical and empirical work evaluating the channels
through which inequality, growth, and any other variables are related." ￿ Forbes (2000)
The debate over the relationship between income inequality and economic growth is
far from settled. Prior to the 1990s, it was generally believed that greater income inequal-
ity is sometimes a necessary price to pay for raising output because of the Kaldor (1956)
hypothesis that greater income inequality promotes saving and hence growth. Conse-
quently, the Kaldorian channel leads to a positive relationship between income inequality
and growth. Similar correlations arise in other models such as Bourguignon (1981) and
Li and Zou (1998). Forbes (2000) concludes from her extensive panel data studies in a
large number of countries, that income inequality and growth rates are most likely to be
positively related. Frank (2009) presents similar evidence based on the data across states
in the United States. However, a large body of literature in the 1990s popularized the
idea of an alternative channel of interaction between income inequality and the growth
rate of per capita income, producing a negative relationship between the two variables.
Solow (1992) outlined a new hypothesis that more "equity" could actually promote more
growth. Persson and Tabellini (1994) report that past inequality is negatively related
to the current growth rate of per capita income, by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
regressions over a cross-section of nations, and offer a political explanation for that re-
sult. Benabou (2002) establishes a negative growth-inequality relationship in a dynamic
general equilibrium (DGE) model. The above literature brings the policy debate on the
growth-inequality relationship to a stalemate by arming both sides with empirical support.
Thus, policy-making is a challenging task. Our objective in this paper is to alleviate that
problem by demonstrating, using New Zealand as a case study, how to extract the relevant
lessons from history for future policy-making.
To achieve that objective, we extend Benabou’s (2002) framework by taking into ac-
count physical capital, not just human capital, in a way that would allow us to undertake
a more comprehensive analysis of the effects of taxation policies. This feature seems
both appropriate for studying issues concerning inequality and growth and is quite com-
mon in the developed countries. A distinctive history of the 1990s New Zealand economy,
markedbycontroversialchangesinpolicywithsigni￿cantimplicationsforthesubsequent
changes in income inequality and economic growth, makes the New Zealand economy an
appropriate case for study using this model. Thus our paper delivers in two distinctive
dimensions.
First, it provides a modi￿ed DGE model based on Benabou (2002) that rationalizes
multiple facets of the growth-inequality relationship reported in the earlier empirical liter-
ature as alternative scenarios of the equilibrium outcome in response to alternative pertur-
bations of the model’s parameters. Second, it reports new ￿ndings with signi￿cant policy
implications from a set of quantitative experiments based on analyzing the simulated out-
2comes of the above model, calibrated to the 1990s New Zealand economy. In particular,
we discover that changes in immigration policy, that altered the degree of heterogeneity in
the distribution of human capital, contributed to a negative growth-inequality relationship
subsequently. In addition, shifts in the redistributive policies from a suf￿ciently large de-
gree of progressive redistribution contributed to a positive growth-inequality relationship
but for a quite subtle reason that is speci￿c to the history of the New Zealand economy.
To bring out the underlying theories that drive those multifaceted simulation outcomes,
we return to our model’s assumptions and the dynamics that follow from it and focus on
two distinct scenarios.
Inonescenario, thedegreeofheterogeneityin thehumancapitaldistributionincreases
(or decreases) exogenously due to an exogenous change in immigration policy, for exam-
ple, which corresponds to the New Zealand experience. The above shock increases (or
decreases) heterogeneity of expertise among the owner-operated production units in the
economy. The combined assumptions of no credit market and a convex home production
technology, which is subject to diminishing returns on combined inputs of physical and
human capital, makes such an increase in inequality produce a growth-retarding effect.
This ￿nding puts a new twist in the policy debate suggesting that a negative growth-
inequality relationship may not necessarily call for income redistribution. Rather, it may
ask us to explore suitable mechanisms to reduce heterogeneity in the population charac-
teristics. A suitably-controlled immigration policy could ful￿l that task.
In the other scenario, we change the rate of progressivity in the income tax struc-
ture and allow automatic and proportionate adjustment in public subsidy to education,
which is, in a way, similar to New Zealand’s policy framework following the Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1993. We ￿nd that if the above shock accompanies a higher (or
lower) progressivity, it pushes down (or up) the long-run, steady-state income inequality
relative to its initial state. We explain this result using the analytical properties of the
model. The model’s steady-state inequality is unique and its transitional dynamics satisfy
a unique monotone convergence property. Consequently, income inequality monoton-
ically decreases (or increases) to its new steady-state following the ￿scal policy shock
involving an increase (or a decrease) of progressivity. The growth rate, however, gets
pushed from opposite directions. A higher (or lower) progressivity provides an immedi-
ate boost upwards (or downwards) by lowering (or raising) the interpersonal productivity
differentials and, thereby, raising (or lowering) the macroeconomic productivity. At the
same time, a higher (or lower) progressivity discourages (encourages) work effort, saving
and investment in education, and thereby retards (or promotes) economic growth. The
macroeconomic effect of raising progressivity on productivity dominates the associated
microeconomic disincentives if, and only if, the progressivity does not exceed a critical
threshold. The quantitative estimate of this threshold progressivity for an economy de-
pends on, among other things, the ￿scal policy regime that utilizes government subsidy
on education and other measures to offset typical disincentives of progressive redistri-
bution. Consequently, the net effect of increasing (lowering) progressivity can only be
determined quantitatively because the relative strengths of competing economic forces,
3mentioned above, govern the ultimate outcome. That is where the importance of our
quantitative experiment lies.
The threshold progressivity for New Zealand turns out to fall well below the range
of progressivity rates that we observe in New Zealand during the period of our experi-
ment. Consequently, ￿scal policy shocks during that period give rise to a positive growth-
inequality relationship. However, this positive growth-inequality relationship does not
mean that an increasing inequality is a necessary price to pay for faster growth. By exam-
ining the analytical properties of the model, we conclude that with suitable adjustments
in the redistributive policy package, such as exempting tax on saving or subsidy for work,
similar to the recently introduced "working for families bene￿t" that rewards hours of
work, the New Zealand Government can push this threshold up and above suf￿ciently to
turn the positive growth-inequality relationship into a negative one. Afterwards, increased
progressivity would lead the economy to a path of faster growth with lower income in-
equality. Consequently, contrary to popular interpretation of data, a positive growth-
inequality relationship does not mean that increasing inequality must be a necessary price
to pay for faster growth.
Following the Introduction, Section 2 describes the New Zealand data. Section 3
presentsthemodel. Section4providesanalyticalresultsforthemodel’sgrowth-inequality
relationship. Section 5 presents the quantitative analysis of the model’s make-up. Section
6 concludes. The Appendix, including proofs of lemmas and propositions that are not
included in the body of the paper, follows before the list of references.
2 The New Zealand Data and Related Literature
Following a series of economic reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Evans
et al., 1996, for a quick summary), New Zealand’s income inequality and GDP growth
rate have changed dramatically over the last two decades, when compared with its long
history of a relatively stable path of development in earlier decades. At the same time, we
note that New Zealand immigration policies in the 1990s led to discrete changes in the
net in￿ow of skilled and unskilled immigrants (see, e.g., Winkelmann and Winkelmann,
1998). One would expect such changes in the mix of immigrants to residents to alter
the underlying degree of heterogeneity in the distribution of human capital as well. The
government has also changed the average marginal income tax rate signi￿cantly, on more
than one occasion, in the 1990s and 2000s. In our model economy, both of the above
changes would likely produce signi￿cant changes in income inequality and growth rate.
Consequently, we expected that the New Zealand experience would shed light on the
origin and relative strengths of various channels of growth-inequality relationships if we
￿ltered the relevant data using a benchmark model for the New Zealand economy.
With that objective, we ￿rst examined data from the New Zealand economy on: (1)
income inequality, (2) growth rate of real GDP per capita, (3) the proportion of skilled and
unskilled labor in the labor force, and (4) the average marginal tax rate (MTR). We chose
4the period between 1992 and 2007 for our study, primarily because that was the time
when most changes took place. Secondly, we calibrated the model’s parameter values
to match relevant statistics from the New Zealand economy with the model’s outcome.
Thirdly, we discuss effects on the relationship between inequality and growth through
impulse response analysis of shocks to the model’s unique balanced growth state, (i) from
changes in the degree of heterogeneity in the human capital distribution due to discrete
changes in net immigration ￿ows that capture New Zealand experience, and (ii) from
changes in the progressivity of a redistributive policy package around values comparable
to the data for the 1990s New Zealand economy.
2.1 Income Inequality
First, we present data on income inequality. Figure 1 below plots annual data on the
measure of income inequality de￿ned in Benabou (2002).1 It shows how New Zealand
income inequality has changed during the last two decades. The solid and dotted lines in
the following Figure represent the actual and HP2 ￿lter-smoothed data, respectively.
Figure 1￿Annual data on the income inequality in New Zealand from 1992 to 2007.
In Figure 1 above, we use the dotted trend line, smoothed by HP ￿lter, to identify
three different phases. We note that income inequality increases by about 50%, from a
1Incomeinequality, followingBenabou(2002), isde￿nedasthelogarithmoftheratioofmeantomedian
income. Source: This annual data is constructed from New Zealand Income Survey and Census Data for
1992, 1996.
2In Figures 1 and 2, we include the smoothed line to identify changes in the trend of inequality and
growth rate using the HP ￿lter, with the smoothing parameter value set to 10.
5low value of 0.20 in 1992 to a high value of 0.30 in 1999 (phase 1), and then decreases
by about 40% until 2004 (phase 2) to a low value of 0.18, and has been increasing again
since 2004, reaching a mark of about 0.25 in 2007 by about 45% (phase 3).
2.2 The Growth Rate
We also note signi￿cant and discrete jumps in growth rates of per capita income from
Figure 2 below. The solid and dotted lines represent actual and HP ￿lter-smoothed data
respectively.
Figure 2￿The average annual growth rate of New Zealand GDP from 1992 to 2006.3
We also note from Figure 2 that the growth rate increased in the ￿rst half of phase 1,
from 1992 to 1994, from -5% to 5.2%, and then decreased in the second half of phase 1,
from 1994 to 1999, from 5.2% to -0.3%. But, overall, from the dotted line, we can see
the growth rate increases signi￿cantly. In phase 2, the growth rate increases from 1999 to
2003, followed by a small ￿uctuation.
2.3 Heterogeneity in Human Capital Distribution
The degree of heterogeneity in the human capital distribution requires a proxy. In this
paper, following Borjas’ (2003) ￿nding that both schooling and work experience deter-
mine the immigrant’s human capital, we choose the variance of skill composition of net
3Source: These annual data are from Statistics New Zealand, Table 6.1, Series: SNCA.S6RB01NZ.
6immigrants to New Zealand as the proxy for that economic parameter, assuming that such
heterogeneity can be largely identi￿ed with the pro￿le of the distribution of occupational
skill.
Based on information on the occupations of migrants available from arrival or depar-
ture cards, Statistics New Zealand provide data on migrants after associating them into
various occupational categories. Some of the occupations are basic and do not require
specialized or high levels of education, while others do. Based on such information, we
divided all occupations into two discrete categories: skilled and unskilled. In the fol-
lowing two graphs, we use annual data to show how the distribution of residents (Figure
3a) and net immigrants (Figure 3b) into skilled and unskilled categories changed between
1992 and 2007.
Figure 3a￿Distribution of skilled and unskilled residents of New Zealand in each year ranging
from 1992 to 20074.
4Source: These annual data are from the Household Labour Force Survey, New Zealand, Table 4.05.
7Figure 3b￿Distribution of skilled and unskilled immigrants to New Zealand in each year ranging
from 1992 to 20075.
First, by comparing Figures 3a and 3b, we conclude that the changes in the distribu-
tion of skilled and unskilled immigrants correspond to similar changes in the distribution
of skill among New Zealand residents. Second, in phase 1 from 1992 to 1999, we can
see that the percentage gap between skilled and unskilled labor decreases. The size of the
decline was about 5% among all resident labor and more than 100% among the immi-
grants. After 2001, the gap increased signi￿cantly and discretely.
2.4 Progressivity
DataontheprogressivityofvariousredistributivepolicypackagespursuedinNewZealand
is measured by the income-weighted average marginal income tax rate for each year, the
data for which is readily available from the OECD database.6
In Figure 4 below, we plot the income-weighted average marginal income tax rates for
each year to show how progressivity in the redistributive policy package makes discrete
jumps more than once during the period of our study, 1992 to 2007.
5Note that immigrants here refers to the net immigrants. It equals the number of arrivals minus the
number of departures. Source: This annual data is from Statistics New Zealand, Series: EMIA.S13EZ1￿
EMIA.S13EZ9 for arrivals, EMIA.S2ZEZ1￿EMIA.S2ZEZ9 for departures.
6We construct the data using Table 1.4 of the following link to the OECD tax database:
http://www.oecd.org/document/60/0,3343,en_2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_1,00.html
8Figure 4￿New Zealand average marginal tax rate from 1992 to 2007.
We note that in phase 1 and, in particular, between 1996 and 1999, progressivity
decreases from 0.285 to 0.218, by about 24%. In phase 2, from 2002 to 2004, it increases
by more than 50%.
2.5 Growth-Inequality Relationships
To sum up, in phase 1 (1992 to 1999), we see that income inequality increases by about
50%. This increase corresponds mainly to the decrease in progressivity. In general, the
growth rate increases from a negative average to a positive average in this period. Thus,
we observe a positive relationship between inequality and the growth rate in phase 1.
Inphase2(1999to2004), incomeinequalitydecreasesbyabout40%whilethegrowth
rate increases. This outcome corresponds to a discrete increase in progressivity as well
as an increase in the heterogeneity of the human capital distribution. The relationship
between inequality and growth appears to be negative in this phase.
In phase 3 (2004 to 2007), income inequality increases by about 45%, while the




ular, derives an explicit dynamic relationship between income inequality and the growth
9rate of per capita income as an equilibrium outcome of a standard dynamic general equi-
librium model popularly used in the literature (e.g., Benabou, 2002, and Zhang, 2005).
3.1 Endowment, Technology and Preference
We consider the model of an economy with a continuum of agents indexed by i 2 [0;1]
who live for an in￿nite periods. Each agent i is self-employed, and begins life with
initial endowments of expertise or human capital hi
0 and intermediate capital inputs ki
0 for
production, such that the distribution of endowments is jointly lognormally distributed.
Each agent i is also endowed with one unit of labor in each period t = 0, 1, 2,::: which
she divides between leisure and work-effort ei
t from home as a self-employed unit. She
uses intermediate capital inputs such as fertilizer, seeds or pencils and papers that perish
completely during the production process, and operates a technology from home, such
as working from home or farming in her backyard. We assume that the output yi
t of a
self-employed agent i, at each date t; as a function of her work-effort ei
t, her intermediate
capital input ki
t and her expertise or human capital hi
















￿" , where, " = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
She invests in her schooling to update her expertise, part of which loses relevance over
time. She also bene￿ts from the accumulation of human capital by others, which we call
knowledge spillover. We assume that, as a function of her date t expenditure on schooling
si
1t, which includes government subsidy and the knowledge spillover externality ￿t, her














￿￿ , ￿;￿ 2 (0;1),
where ￿
i
t is an i:i:d:shock to her ef￿ciency in using or accessing her own human capital for
bene￿ting from knowledge spillover with ln ￿
i
t s N (￿￿2=2;￿2), where ￿2 is a constant.
The knowledge spillover externality ￿t increases with the average stock of human capital










, ￿ ￿ 0.
Being self-employed with no durable assets to mortgage against, like most small-scale,
owner-operated ￿rms in New Zealand, she faces severe borrowing constraints, and we
assume that she uses her own savings from the previous period to get intermediate capital






7We assume that our economy is a capital-scarce economy and, as observed in a small open economy
such as New Zealand, capital may come from foreign countries. We only require that capital goods are
perishable and that agents cannot borrow. Consequently, they must use their own saving to buy capital
goods, wherever they come from, home or abroad.
10Following the progressive tax system in New Zealand and in most other countries, the
government in our model economy has a scheme of progressive income taxation and










where ￿ measures the average marginal income tax rate and ~ yt represents the break-even












where yt denotes the per-capita output or income at a given period t. The government
also provides suf￿cient subsidy to schooling to offset the adverse effect of income tax on
schooling and ￿nance it with consumption taxes, such that the total amount of schooling
subsidy and consumption tax are monotone functions of ￿ which serves as the policy
parameter in our model.



















￿, ￿ > 1,
zi
t > 0 and ei
t ￿ 0 denote, respectively, consumption and work effort of the agent i in











where z0 denotes a constant consumption tax rate.
3.2 Individual Optimization
Let mht, mkt denote the means and ￿2
ht, ￿2
kt denote the variances of lnhi
t and lnki
t, re-
spectively, covt denote the covariance between lnhi
t and lnki
t and let Mt denote the vector
(mht;mkt;￿2
ht;￿2
kt;covt). By (7)-(8), each agent faces a concave optimization exercise,
such that each date t, given the state variables, (hi
t;ki




































11Lemma 1: The ￿rst order conditions of the above Bellman Equation imply:
(10) e ￿
￿
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We now describe the model’s equilibrium and the associated dynamics before going
to the section on quantitative analysis.
3.3 Implications of the Optimal Decision Rules
The above optimization exercise implies that at each date t, by (4), (1), (5), (10) and






t+1 = ln￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)lne + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)lnk
i
t (13)
+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)lnh
i
t + ￿ ln ~ yt,
lnh
i
t+1 = ln￿ + ln￿t + ￿ln
￿￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿





t + (￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))lnh
i
t + ￿￿ ln ~ yt.
We de￿ne, for each date t, an index of income inequality ￿t as the logarithm of the
ratio of mean to median income, following Benabou (2002).
Lemma 2: a. The evolution of earnings of adults is governed by a lognormal distrib-
ution such that lnyi












b. Thebreak-evenlevelofincome ~ yt atwhichanagent’snettaxobligationiszerosatis￿es:
ln ~ yt = lnyt + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t (16)
= ￿mkt + ￿mht + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)lne + (2 ￿ ￿)￿t.
12Proof: See Appendix.
Given the initial condition, M0, implied by the initial jointly lognormal distribution
of physical and human capital, by (13), (14), and the optimal decision rules, (10)￿(14),
imply that, at each date t, the sequence of vector Mt must satisfy:
(17) mkt+1 = ln￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)lne + ￿mkt + ￿mht + ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)￿t,
(18) ￿
2
kt+1 = 2(1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿t,




+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)lne (19)
+ ￿￿mkt + (￿ + ￿￿ + ￿)mht + ￿￿￿
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+ 2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))covt,
covt+1 = ￿￿
2 (1 ￿ ￿)
2 ￿
2
kt + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))￿
2
ht (21)
+ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 2￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))covt.
3.4 De￿nition of Equilibrium
We de￿ne the model’s equilibrium as the set of decision rules described by (10)￿(14) for
the agents and the sequence of vector fMtg of state variables described by (17) - (21) for
the economy, such that, for each agent, the decision rules satisfy the optimization problem
given by the Bellman Equation (9). The sequence of vector fMtg that the agent i takes as
given in (9), coincides with the solutions to the dynamical system de￿ned by (17) - (21).
In other words, the equilibrium sequence of vector of aggregate state variables fMtg
solves a ￿xed-point problem such that, at each date t = 0;1;2;::; individual decision























In this section, we present a few key analytical results. They help us to explore how our
model’s assumptions in￿uence our conclusions. These analytical results also help us later
to identify, speci￿cally, various economic mechanisms that drive our ￿ndings, based on
numerical simulations.
134.1 Model’s Growth-Inequality Relationship
Recall from Section 3.3 that, by Lemma 2, the income inequality index ￿ equals the
variance of pre-tax income. The following Lemma states the key analytical result for
this paper involving a generalized dynamic relationship between the above measure of
income inequality, together with variance of human and physical capital on one hand, and
the growth rate of per capita income on the other hand.
Lemma 3: If, and only if, (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿￿￿ = 08 then the equilibrium outcome
gives rise to perpetual endogenous growth accompanied by an explicit and endogenous
relationship between income inequality and the growth rate of per capita income, ￿t ￿
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where ￿ ￿ ￿
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+ (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿ln￿￿, e is given by (10) and L
denotes lag operator.
Proof: See Appendix.
Equations (15)-(21), together with (23), describe the model’s unique dynamic rela-
tionship between income inequality and the rate of growth. In the long run, the above
transitional dynamics approach a unique ergodic limiting distribution where both the in-
come inequality and the per capita income growth rate remain stationary. We summarize
this feature in the following Proposition.
PROPOSITION 1: From any arbitrary initial state, the equilibrium sequence of ￿2
kt+1,
￿2
ht+1, covt+1, ￿t and ￿t, described by (18), (20), (21), (15) and (23) converges monoton-
ically to its unique ergodic steady state.
Proof: See Appendix.
Next, we elaborate on the equation (23) to establish analytical results on dynamics of
the growth-inequality relationship that arise as equilibrium outcomes of our model econ-
omy. In particular, we show how our missing credit market assumption in￿uences a neg-
ative growth-inequality relationship, and how a scheme of progressive redistribution of
8Substituting this condition into (11), we can reach the same conclusion as Zhang (2003), in which he
found that the private saving rate for education decreases with the degree of externality.
14income, which utilizes public subsidy to education to offset accompanying economic dis-
tortion, contributes to a positive growth-inequality relationship. Also, we explore the im-
portance of other assumptions, such as external spillover of knowledge and non-tradable
capital goods, by examining if and how they may in￿uence the logical foundation of our
analysis regarding these multifaceted growth-inequality relationships.
4.1.1 A Negative Growth-Inequality Relationship
Wechoosetheparameter￿2, whichdirectlyin￿uencesthevarianceofef￿ciencyofhuman
capital and, thereby, variance of expertise, to proxy for the degree of heterogeneity in the
human capital distribution. As discussed earlier, a discrete change in immigration policy
(animmigrationshock)couldconceivablychangethevalueof￿2, asitmayfundamentally
alter the characteristics of the population.
Importance of the missing credit market The following lemma brings out the impli-
cations of our assumption of the missing credit market, together with diminishing returns
technologies, for production of output and human capital. The absence of a credit market
creates rigid and inef￿cient interpersonal differences in marginal productivity of human
and physical capital. In the presence of diminishing returns technology for accumulating
human capital and production of output as the variance of productivity increases the av-
erage output decreases. Consequently, in such an environment any economic factor that
increases heterogeneity among the production units would lower per capita output and
hence its growth rate in the present context. At the same time a greater heterogeneity
would imply larger income inequality. Thus the outcomes for changes in income inequal-
ity and growth rate are exactly opposite. In presence of a credit market, on the other hand,
a larger inequality or a larger productivity difference would foster among the agents mu-
tually bene￿cial exchanges and higher growth. Thus, inequality and growth will be pos-
itively related in the presence of a credit market. The following lemma illustrates how
the missing credit market plays a key role in giving rise to a negative growth-inequality
relationship.
Lemma 4: If, in a speci￿c period, the variance of expertise among the production units
increases, then, in that same period, the growth rate decreases while income inequality
increases.
Proof: Substituting (18), (20) and (21) into (15) yields
￿t+1 = ￿
2￿
2=2 + ((￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)
2 ￿t (24)




￿￿(￿ + (￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿))￿￿covt.
15Then substituting (24) into (23) and differentiating w.r.t ￿2, we get
(25)
@￿t
@￿2 = ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)=2 < 0.
The above equation shows that if ￿2 increases, ￿t will decrease. In contrast, by (24),
we see that if ￿2 increases, ￿t+1 increases. It then implies that the correlation between
inequality and growth is negative when there is an immigration shock. ￿
Importance of the knowledge spillover externality We make a concluding observa-
tion for this section to shed light on how our modelling assumptions in￿uence our results.
Our assumption of a positive knowledge spillover parameterized by ￿ > 0 turns out to
be critical for generating a negative growth-inequality relationship. If ￿ = 0 then our
endogenous growth condition, as stated in Lemma 3, would require that either the pro-
ductiontechnologyorthehumancapitalaccumulationtechnologymustexhibitincreasing
returns; but that would offset the possibility of a negative growth-inequality relationship,
which typically requires a unique combination of assumptions of a missing credit market
and technologies with diminishing returns.
Thus, our model accommodates scenarios in which an increase in income inequality
retards future economic growth. These special scenarios of growth-retarding inequality
coincide with the empirical ￿ndings of Persson and Tabellini (1994). However, they pro-
vide alternative and wider interpretations of the data, since, unlike Persson and Tabellini
(1994), the effect of past income inequality on the future growth rate does not just work
through changes in the income tax rate parameter ￿. The equation (23) demonstrates ex-
plicitly that the effect of past income inequality also works through changes in various
other economic factors, including the variance ￿2 of ef￿ciency in the human capital us-
age, the knowledge spillover externality ￿, and other parameters that in￿uence the extent
of diminishing returns in the production technologies for output and human capital. As
per furthering future empirical research, the model’s explicit transitional dynamics, as de-
scribed by (23), provide an alternative restriction on the growth-inequality data compared
to what Persson and Tabellini (1994) used for their regressions.
4.1.2 A Positive Growth-Inequality Relationship
Theeconomicdynamicssummarizedin(23)canalsogenerateapositivegrowth-inequality
relationship. Typically, they do so in response to a ￿scal policy shock that changes the
progressivity parameter ￿ which accompanies some offsetting subsidy to private expen-
diture on education. An increase in ￿ decreases steady-state income inequality and,
thereby, pushes it below its current state. Consequently, by Proposition 1, income in-
equality monotonically decreases to its new steady state. Next, we make it clear that our
income inequality index does indeed decrease with an increased degree ￿ of progressivity
of redistribution.
16Lemma 5: A higher value of progressivity parameter ￿ corresponds to a monoton-
ically decreasing sequence of income inequality which converges to a new steady state
characterized by a lower index ￿ of income inequality.
Proof: By (18), (20) and (21), we establish that in response to a higher value of ￿ in a
speci￿c period, the values of ￿2
kt, ￿2
ht and covt decrease in all subsequent periods and, by
Lemma 2, income inequality follows the same path. Also, by Proposition 1, it decreases
monotonically to its new steady state. ￿
However, an increase in ￿ creates two opposing effects on the growth rate. On one
hand, by lowering income inequality it fosters growth but, on the other hand, by discour-
aging work-effort and saving, it slows down growth. The overall effect is ambiguous.
The following Lemma characterizes a condition when a change in ￿ implies a positive
growth-inequality relationship in subsequent periods.
Importance of government subsidy to investment in education In most developed
countries, including New Zealand, public subsidy on education goes hand-in-hand with a
progressive redistribution of income as an integral component of redistribution. A public
policyof educationsubsidyisdesignedinthemodel economytooffset thenegativeincen-
tive effect of income tax on investment in education. Greater progressivity accompanied
by offsetting subsidy works to redistribute income in the model economy by increasing
investment in education for those whose disposable income lies below the break-even
income, and by decreasing investment for those whose disposable income is above the
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Proof: By (11) the gross investment in education that includes public subsidy is a con-
stant fraction of one’s disposable income and, by the design of this subsidy, that fraction
is independent of the progressivity parameter ￿.
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The above equation shows that if, and only if, yi
t ￿ ~ yt, then
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In other words, the redistributive package, consisting of a progressive income tax
and a proportional education subsidy, redistributes allocation of resources to education
17from the rich with income above the threshold ~ yt to the poor with income below ~ yt. The
following two Lemmas show that in the absence of a subsidy on saving or on work, the
negative effect of redistribution on these two variables is more pervasive in the population
than on the investment in education.
Lemma 7: A greater progressivity reduces work effort and the desired saving for a
larger fraction of the population.
Proof: By (10) the negative effect of ￿ on work effort follows in a straightforward
way. By (12), it follows that unlike investment in education, both rate of saving and gross
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The above equation shows that the negative effect of income taxation not only lowers the
savings of the rich, for whom the income exceeds ~ yt, but it also lowers the savings of the
lower middle-class, whose income falls in the range between ~ yt and ~ y
￿
t , and the size of
this class increases with progressivity. Thus, a higher progressivity increases the size of
the population who respond with a decision to reduce saving. ￿
Lemma 8: There exists a threshold limit for progressivity ￿￿ such that if ￿ > ￿￿ then
@￿t
@￿ < 0.9
Proof: To analyze how an increase of progressivity parameter ￿ in period t affects the
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18We note from the above equation that the ￿rst two terms are negative. They measure
microeconomic disincentives of redistribution on saving and work-effort, respectively.
The third term measures macroeconomic bene￿ts from redistribution-led productivity en-
hancement due to relaxing the credit constraints of the agents with low stocks of physical
and human capital, but in an economy with diminishing returns in both production tech-
nology and human capital accumulation. This term could be positive with low progressiv-
ity and, in particular, if (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ (￿ + (￿ + ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)) > 0. Clearly,
if ￿ > ￿￿, then the third term is also negative and hence
@￿t
@￿ < 0. We conclude that too
high a progressivity rate would be counter-productive, since the mechanism of relaxing
the credit constraints ceases to be effective once everyone in the economy can afford to
reach the unconstrained optimum. Any additional transfer to the poor would be simply
consumed by them and that would be harmful to growth. ￿
Consequently, in an economy with too high a progressivity rate, growth rates and
progressivity would be inversely related and, by Lemma 5, inequality is always negatively
related to progressivity. It follows, therefore, for the case ￿ > ￿￿, following an increase
in ￿ in some period t, the dynamics of growth and inequality would re￿ect a positive
relationship.
It is important to note, however, that the above Lemma only provides a suf￿cient and
not a necessary condition. Indeed, we can get a positive growth-inequality relationship
even if ￿ < ￿￿, provided the microeconomic disincentives on work-effort and saving
outweigh the macroeconomic growth bene￿t from a reduction of interpersonal differences
in productivity with income redistribution.
The importance of capital goods as complementary inputs to human capital The
above conclusion, that an economy with a suf￿ciently high progressivity rate prior to a
change in ￿ would subsequently generate a positive growth-inequality relationship, does
have one important caveat, as outlined in the following Lemma.
Lemma 9: Without physical capital (i.e., ￿ = 0) in the model, an increase in income
inequality always retards future economic growth regardless of the value of ￿.
Proof: If ￿ = 0, by (24), we can get
(27) ￿t+1 = ￿
2￿
2=2 + (￿ + ￿￿(1 ￿ ￿))
2 ￿t.
Substituting (27) into (23) and rearranging yields
￿t = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)lne + ￿t+1 ￿
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2 > 0,
the above equation shows that the growth-inequality relationship is always negative. ￿
19Lemma 9 justi￿es our inclusion of physical capital in the model in a way that sig-
ni￿cantly distinguishes our work from Benabou (1996, 2002) and others who ￿nd only
a negative growth-inequality relationship in their model. In other words, by Lemma 9,
we suggest that the absence of a positive growth-inequality relationship in those models
follows from the fact that they do not allow the presence of complementary capital goods
for augmenting marginal productivity of human capital.
In the following section, we carry out impulse response analysis of the model to dis-
cusshowtwospeci￿cpolicyshocks, whichreceivedenormousattentioninNewZealand’s
policy debates (see, Evans et al., 1996), make their impact on income inequality and
growth outcome and on the subsequent growth-inequality relationships in New Zealand
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The two speci￿c policy shocks that stand out in the
media debate arise from sudden, discrete and controversial changes in public policies re-
lated to immigration and income redistribution. In the following section, we carefully
design a benchmark model for the New Zealand economy. Within that calibrated model
economy, we conduct controlled experiments based on numerical simulations to derive
new insights that could potentially advance the quality of the economic policy debate
regarding the so-called growth-inequality relationship.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we ￿rst calibrate the parameters of our model to reproduce key statistics
from the New Zealand economy as our model’s equilibrium outcome. In that benchmark
model economy of New Zealand, we design a set of controlled experiments to carry out
impulse response analysis of the model’s equilibrium path corresponding to one speci￿c
policy shock at a time. Each shock corresponds to the speci￿c history of events in New
Zealand during the period from 1992 to 2007.10
5.1 Calibration of Parameters
The key parameters needed are: the output elasticities of unskilled labor " and of physical
and human capital ￿ and ￿, respectively; the auto-correlation of human capital parameter
￿; theeffectivenessoftheeducationsystem￿; thevarianceofhumancapitalef￿ciency￿2;
the human capital index ￿; the inter-temporal elasticity of labor supply ￿ which identi￿es
the preference parameter ￿; and each agent’s discount factor ￿.
10One advantage of our experiment is that we know our model economy well enough to be able to
clearly isolate the effects of one shock from another. Also, following the description of each experiment,
we present interpretations of the results with an internally-consistent-story-line based on the analytical
properties of the equilibrium of the model economy of New Zealand. Clearly, the model’s interpretation of
the impulse responses re￿ects a story-line which can have reasonable alternatives from other models that
focus on other important shocks with different story-lines. However, developing such an alternative that
would utilize multiple shocks, including those we consider in our DGE model of endogenous growth and
income inequality, remains an ongoing challenge for the seriously interested researchers.
20Production Parameters
Statistics New Zealand provides data on incomes for the self-employed and wage
and salary earners. The sum of these values is regarded as the total labor income, while
government transfers, bene￿ts, business and rent losses are excluded. On average, the
ratioofthelaborincometoGDPwas0.45duringtheperiodofourstudy. Inourdiscussion
on the equilibrium of our model, we show a 1-1 mapping between the economy of the
self-employed with a backyard technology, to that of a corresponding technology with
the identical capital and labor shares but in a competitive environment. Consequently, the
above methodology for estimating the backyard technology of our model is justi￿ed.
Next, we follow the methodology of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) to specify
shares of human capital ￿ and raw labor ". Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) regard
laborers who earn the minimum wage as having no human capital. The share of human
capital is calculated by multiplying one minus the ratio of the minimum wage to the av-
erage wage by the labor share, that is ￿ = (1 ￿ ratio) ￿ labor share. The ratio of the
minimum wage to the average wage, according to the data from Statistics New Zealand
in 1996, was 0.42. Therefore, we get ￿ = 0:55, ￿ = 0:26 and " = 0:19.
Inequality
Following Benabou (2002), we measure income inequality by using the logarithm of
the ratio of the mean to median income. In New Zealand, according to data from Statistics
New Zealand’s Household Economic Surveys, the logarithm of the ratio of the mean to
median income decreased from 0.31 to 0.23 between 1998 and 2006. Using (15), we set
￿2 = 4, so that the feasible range of income inequality is [0.14, 0.33].
Balanced Growth Rate
AccordingtoStatisticsNewZealand11, theaverageGDPgrowthrate, basedon1995/96
prices per capita, between 1994 and 2004 was 2.4%, while, according to the New Zealand
Treasury, the average marginal income tax rate in the corresponding period was approx-
imately 26.3%. Then, by (23), to match the 2.4% long-run growth rate with ￿ = 26:3%,
we set human capital index ￿ = 23:7 and ￿ = 0:58.
Earning Return to Education


























11Data source: Statistics New Zealand, Table 6.1, Series SNCA.S6RB01NZ.
21The earning return to education is ￿￿. From Maani (1996), we know the rate of return
to education was approximately 10%. Therefore, given ￿ = 0:26, we get ￿ = 0:38.
Labor Supply
Kalb and Scutella (2003), by using four separately-estimated sets of discrete choice
labor supply models, found that the average wage elasticities in New Zealand were 0.24,
0.40, 0.63 and 0.82, for married men, married women, single men, and single women,
respectively. From the Statistics New Zealand 2001 Household Economic Survey, we
have found that married men, married women, single men and single women account for
more than 90% of the total labor in the market. Therefore, after multiplying the wage
elasticities with their corresponding percentage of the labor population and taking the
sum, the average labor supply elasticity of New Zealand is around 0.45. Equivalently,
this means that ￿ = 3:2.
Discount Factor
To have a time period t comparable to the average duration of the three distinct phases
mentioned earlier, we chose a time discount factor ￿ = 0:82 that would be consistent with
a 4% real interest rate.












5.2 Numerical Experiments and Results
In this subsection, we report on the impulse response analysis of the income inequality
and growth to two speci￿c shocks. One is an immigration shock and the other is a ￿scal
policy shock.




First, through impulse response analysis, we discuss the effects of an immigration shock
on the dynamic path of income inequality and the growth rate. Clearly, a change in im-
migration policy would most likely alter the distribution of characteristics of a country’s
population signi￿cantly. In particular, it could change the mean and the variance of the
exogenous component of a country’s human capital distribution. In our model economy,
a change in the mean would have no effect on income inequality. However, a change
in the mean preserving spread of the distribution of ef￿ciency of human capital usage
would have a non-trivial impact on both income inequality and the future growth rates in
our model economy. This property of the model ￿nds strong empirical support from the
recent work of Borjas (2003) and Card (2009), as they both con￿rm signi￿cant changes
in income inequality and wage growth following large swings in immigration. The pa-
rameter ￿2, which measures the variance of ef￿ciency in human capital usage, captures
such effects and, therefore, we identify an immigration shock with a change in ￿2, and we
focus on the impulse response analysis of a change in ￿2 to understand how changes in
immigration policies may impact on the growth-inequality dynamics. We now describe
such an experiment.
Suppose that before period t = 3, the economy was on a balanced growth path, and
￿ = 26:3% such that ￿ = 2:4%. Suppose that, in period t = 3, a change in the gov-
ernment’s immigration policies led to a one-off decrease in the variance of human capital
ef￿ciency ￿2. We regard the drop in ￿2 as an immigration shock that allows immigration
￿ows to vary in a way that reduces the variance of skill in the labor force.
Using the benchmark values from Table 1, (18), (20), (21) and (15) for simulating in-
equality and equation (23) for growth, Figure 5 shows the impulse response of the growth
rate and income inequality to the immigration shock when the redistributive income tax
rate is set equal to 26.3%.
23Figure 5￿Impulse response of the growth rate and income inequality to a drop in ￿2, re￿ecting
reduced heterogeneity in the skill distribution of the work force due to policy induced changes in
immigration ￿ows.
Figure 5 shows that, in period three, the growth rate increases from its old balanced
growth state by following a decelerating transition path, while income inequality de-
creases, implying a negative growth-inequality relationship subsequent to the immigra-
tion shock. In the long run, the growth rate converges to its newly enhanced balanced
growth state due to a lower variance in human capital.
The above simulations result is consistent with the data presented in Figures 3a and
3b. In particular, the data show that in Phase 1, the gap of frequency between skilled and
unskilled labor becomes smaller, while the growth rate, shown in Figure 2, increases in
that period. Figure 5 shows that income inequality converges to a lower steady state than
the pre-shock state. This is also consistent with Figure 1 once we can separate the partial
effect of the tax cut which occurred during that period, but is assumed to be constant
in this simulation. Note, however, during a period of stable tax rates, between 1999
and 2003 (phase 2), income inequality generally decreases and the growth rate increases,
although slightly, which is consistent with what the model’s simulation result suggests.
However, the correlation between inequality and growth following the immigration shock
is unambiguously negative.
After reproducing New Zealand’s history with our simulations, we explain those sim-
ulations as a part of our interpretation of what happened. In particular, we interpret the
above simulation results by using Lemma 4 as well as by (28). Lemma 4 explains the
increase in the growth rate and the gradual decline in income inequality following a one-
off decrease in the variance of human capital. In the subsequent periods of transitional
24dynamics, the continued increase in the growth rate comes from the declining income
inequality in the preceding period via (28), while the deceleration of the growth rate
mimics the declining rates of reduction in income inequality as it approaches its new
steady state. The transition dynamics capture a growth-promoting role of declining in-
equality that arises from the combination of assumptions of the missing credit market and
diminishing returns technologies.
Figure 5, together with our model’s explanation for it, brings out a key policy con-
jecture as well. We hypothesize that an immigration policy which successfully reduces
heterogeneity in the country’s labor force, leads the economy over time to a path of faster
growth with lower income inequality. Such a policy requires ￿ltering of immigrants ac-
cording to special skills criteria to ￿ll the gaps in the skill spectrum of New Zealand
residents in a way that would lower the variance of skills.
The above policy insight coincides with the ￿ndings of Friedberg and Hunt (1995)
in which, by studying the skill composition of immigration ￿ows to the United States
from 1950s to 1980s, they conclude that economic bene￿ts increase when immigrants
brings skills that are not very different from the local residents. Borjas (2003) makes a
similar conclusion by examining both the schooling and work experience of the immi-
grants, identifying their signi￿cant skill-gap with the residents and, noting subsequently,
that a large in￿ux of immigrants in recent decades has substantially worsened economic
opportunities in the labor market.
5.2.2 Fiscal policy shock
Next, we discuss the effects of a ￿scal policy shock on the dynamic path of income in-
equality and the growth rate through impulse response analysis. The objective of this
experiment is to capture various changes in the redistributive policy package during eco-
nomic reforms in New Zealand. Evans et al., (1996) and others document a decline of
the average marginal tax rate (AMTR) under the National Government in New Zealand
in the early 1990s, and a subsequent reversal of that policy under the Labour Government
in the late 1990s. Those changes were accompanied by budgetary provisions for various
subsidies and, in particular, education subsidies to schools and universities to keep the
expenditure in line with revenue in the spirit of the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) of
1993.13 In our model economy we identify the changes by reducing education subsidies
endogenously, corresponding to a lower AMTR and vice versa. Also, as Benabou (2002)
argues, a modern government such as New Zealand’s, designs such endogenous subsidy
to education in the context of a wider redistributive policy package, to mitigate the distor-
tionary effects of redistribution, and we capture that spirit in our model economy as well.
In particular, an increase in AMTR discourages work-efforts, saving and investment in
education, while a corresponding increase in public subsidy to education would offset,
at least partially, the negative effect of a tax-hike on investment in education. However,
13The growth of the budget surplus following the FRA of 1993 is typically attributed to the so-called
Cullen Fund, without which the budget would have been more or less balanced.
25governments do not typically provide subsidies to work or saving and, hence, we do not
put them in our model economy. Consequently, disincentives to saving and work from
increased AMTR continue to dampen economic growth in our model.
We now discuss how the effect of a ￿scal policy shock differs from that of an im-
migration policy shock. While the immigration shock can be characterized as purely
exogenous because we can identify it with a single parameter ￿2, the ￿scal shock is partly
endogenous. It allows government subsidy to education as a built-in automatic stabilizer
for offsetting distortionary effects of redistribution and, in particular, the effects of chang-
ing the progressivity parameter ￿. In other words, a discrete change in the progressivity
parameter ￿ and the accompanying automatic changes in the public subsidy to education
are interpreted as a ￿scal policy shock in the following simulation-based experiment.
Figure 6 below shows that, in period 3, the government increases the AMTR from
26.3% to 33%, and both income inequality and growth rate decrease and monotonically
converge to their new stationary states.
Figure 6 ￿Impulse response of the growth rate and income inequality to an increase in progres-
sivity parameter ￿ of a redistributive policy package that includes a government subsidy to offset
the distortionary effects of redistribution on private investment in education.
We interpret this result, based on our model, as follows: First of all, by Lemma 5, a
higher progressivity implies a declining sequence of income inequality in all subsequent
periods, and vice versa. Income redistribution in our model provides a general growth
boost by relaxing the credit constraints of those with higher expected marginal produc-
tivity of capital (broadly de￿ned to include both human and physical capital). However,
26as explained by Lemmas 8 and 9, any redistribution from high income people to low
income people discourages work-effort, saving and investment in education. If the gov-
ernment does not suf￿ciently offset those disincentives of income redistribution, as has
been the case for the New Zealand Government, then the overall effects of changing the
degree of progressivity of redistribution would be ambiguous. By Lemma 8, we know
that if ￿ is suf￿ciently high, an increase (or decrease) in ￿ would lower (or raise) both the
steady-state growth rate and the steady-state income inequality. Facing such theoretical
ambiguity, we need to rely on our quantitative experiment to derive a conclusion.
For the calibrated model of the New Zealand economy, we ￿nd the critical threshold
for the progressivity parameter ￿ lies well below 10%. Given the high degree of pro-
gressivity in the 1990s relative to this threshold, a positive correlation is implied between
income inequality and the growth rate. In addition, we conclude that the observed posi-
tive relationship between income inequality and the growth rate indicates that a reduction
of AMTR in New Zealand would increase growth rate by Lemma 8, while increasing in-
come inequality by Lemma 5 at the same time. In contrast, we ￿nd that, if the government
can subsidize saving or waive taxes on saving, the threshold progressivity that maximizes
long-run growth rate increases to 32%. Consequently, under that policy framework, a
reduction of AMTR below 32% will reduce the long-run growth rate as well as increas-
ing income inequality, giving rise to a negative growth-inequality relationship. Clearly,
that would be a sub-optimal policy. This result parallels Benabou (1996) and Glomm and
Kaganovich (2008) in which they ￿nd that increasing tax rates could enhance or slow
down growth, depending on whether the initial level of tax is low or high, even though
increasing the tax rate always reduces income inequality.
Note also, from Figure 6, that following an increase in the progressivity parameter ￿,
the growth rate drops immediately, while inequality decreases after one period. This is
because by (23), we can see that increasing ￿ leads to immediate distortion in labor and
saving, as a tax rate hike raises leisure but reduces saving. It then leads to an immediate
decrease in growth. In contrast, inequality is a state variable. By Lemma 5, it does
not change in the concurrent period but changes in all subsequent periods. Also, after
the one-off ￿scal policy shock, the decrease in the growth rate becomes relatively small
because the decrease in income inequality in the preceding periods, by (28), provides
an offsetting boost to the otherwise declining growth rate. Consequently, the correlation
between income inequality and growth appears to be positive.
This experiment with a ￿scal shock brings out new insights into the New Zealand
economytogetherwithapolicyconjectureaswell. Theobservedpositivegrowth-inequality
relationship implies, according to our model, that the progressivity in New Zealand is too
high relative to its threshold. Consequently, a reduction of AMTR would lead the econ-
omy to a new balanced growth path with a higher growth rate, but only at the price of
increasing income inequality during the transitional period.
Also, unlike what was discussed earlier in relation to the immigration shock, the ￿nd-
ings reported above appear to be in direct con￿ict with the regression result of Persson
and Tabellini (1994). Instead, they resemble, in a way, Kaldor’s (1957) hypothesis of a
27positive growth-inequality trade-off.
5.3 Multifaceted Growth-Inequality Relationship
From Figures 5 and 6, we discern that two distinct policy shocks can have two distinct im-
plications for the growth-inequality relationship immediately following the policy shocks.
This theoretical underpinning of growth-inequality empirics provides a caution against
conventional regression analysis. It suggests that, prior to conducting an empirical analy-
sis, one may need to pay more attention to the quality of the data in order to determine
whether any policy shocks occurred around the period of their study. This was also of
concern to Banerjee and Du￿o (2003), who emphasized that the quality of data may af-
fect the estimation of the relationship between inequality and growth.
Regarding the policy debates, our two experiments clearly demonstrate that the ap-
parent con￿ict between two political parties, one promoting growth and the other equity,
cannot be satisfactorily resolved unless we discern the underlying economic factors that
initiate an impulse to which our optimal response, in turn, gives rise to a unique set of dy-
namics of income inequality and growth. The optimal policy, as our experiments reveal,
must take into account the speci￿c channel that is quantitatively relevant for developing a
speci￿c growth-inequality relationship.
It turns out that, without our "missing credit market" assumption, the results from
the above two experiments would not hold. In the scenario for ￿scal policy shocks, if we
allow a credit market for borrowing and lending, the threshold progressivity should not be
greater than zero as the individuals would trade away their productivity differentials and,
hence, the macroeconomic bene￿t from redistribution would not be there. Consequently,
changes in progressivity would always create a positive growth-inequality relationship.
In the scenario for immigration shocks, in response to increased heterogeneity, economic
agents would try to utilize their tools of borrowing and lending to achieve a state of
zero productivity differential, a Pareto optimal state. In the process, there would be a
growth spurt as well as widening of income inequality to re￿ect greater heterogeneity of
the population characteristics. The result, again, would be a positive growth-inequality
relationship. We conclude that if credit markets are not a problem, increasing income
inequality would be a necessary price to pay for a faster rate of growth.
On the other hand, if we relax other assumptions of our model but strictly maintain
the "missing credit market" assumption, the qualitative nature of our results, as discussed
in the above two scenarios of impulse response analysis of our model would essentially
remain unchanged. For example, if we allow competitive ￿rms to hire workers and rent
capital to organize production in the economy, but the ￿rms’ total factor productivity
(TFP) varies inversely with heterogeneity of the workforce, the results discussed above
would likely remain unchanged. The assumption of knowledge spillover allows us to
bring in endogenous growth without violating the diminishing returns property of the
output and human capital technologies. Without it we would not have endogenous growth
but would still recover all the results by replacing the growth rate variable with per capita
28output. However, a change in the extent of knowledge spillover does affect the size of
￿uctuations of the model’s equilibrium outcome in response to the two policy shocks
we discussed above. Analyzing the quantitative differences and their implications for
policies would be an interesting avenue for future research, but falls outside the scope of
our objectives for this paper.
5.4 Review of New Zealand Data
To sum up we review the New Zealand data presented earlier in light of the controlled
experiments described above. In particular, to make some sense of the changes in income
inequality and growth rate described in Figures 1 and 2, we apply the insights derived
from our experiments as follows: By (18), (20), and (21) and then (15), we conclude
that changes in income inequality could come either from an exogenous change in the
variance ￿2 of human capital ef￿ciency, or from a change in the average marginal income
tax rate ￿.
By (18), (20), (21) and then (15), we know that income inequality increases with ￿2
but decreases with ￿. We can see from Figures 3a and 3b that, in phase 1, ￿2 decreases,
implying a downward pressure on the trend of income inequality, while we note from
Figure 4 that the tax rate ￿ decreases in phase 1 which exerts upward pressure on income
inequality. In phase 2, the gap between skilled and unskilled residents becomes larger,
implying a larger value of variance ￿2 while the tax rate increases sharply during that
period. Figure 1 shows that income inequality increases in phase 1 but decreases in phase
2. Consequently, Figure 1 indicates that the tax effect dominates the immigration effect
in determining income inequality trends. The effects on the growth rate from changes in
the variance and tax parameters are not straightforward.
Thus, our quantitative analysis of the calibrated model for the New Zealand economy
helps us to make some sense of the New Zealand data and, in particular, to discern the
economic dynamics that give rise to multifaceted growth-inequality relationships.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we set out to explore underlying economic dynamics that give rise to appar-
ently contradictory growth-inequality relationships in the data. We proceeded by extend-
ing Benabou’s (2002) DGE model by allowing both physical and human capital.
One contribution of this paper is that it provides explicit analytical properties to mo-
tivate a new theoretical rationale for interpreting multifaceted growth-inequality relation-
ships as alternative equilibrium outcomes. We calibrated the model’s parameters to create
a benchmark model for the New Zealand economy, and used it to interpret what hap-
pened following a series of major economic reforms in New Zealand that ended in the
early 1990s. We believe that additional insights from our quantitative analysis of the
29model economy provide important clues for solving existing policy puzzles which have a
special relevance to the current policy debate in New Zealand.
For example, we learn from the simulations of the calibrated model’s equilibrium,
that immigration and tax policy shocks may have signi￿cantly different implications for
growth-inequality relationships. In particular, we discover that changes in immigration
policies that alter variance of skill distribution subsequently lead to a negative growth-
inequality relationship while changes in redistributive policies have an ambiguous effect
on that relationship. If the minimum threshold for progressivity that maximizes the long-
run growth rate is too low compared to existing progressivity, which has been the case for
New Zealand all along, then a change in progressivity would lead to a positive growth-
inequality relationship. If the threshold is made too high relative to the current level,
for example, by eliminating tax on saving, then a negative growth-inequality relationship
would follow a change in progressivity. In particular, a higher progressivity in that case
would bring faster economic growth with lower income inequality.
Our study shows that, contrary to popular belief, a negative growth-inequality rela-
tionship does not automatically call for increased redistribution. Instead, it asks us to ￿nd
a mechanism to reduce heterogeneity in the population characteristics. A suitably con-
trolled immigration policy could ful￿l that task. Similarly, a positive growth-inequality
relationship does not mean that increasing inequality is a necessary price to pay for faster
growth. It may simply signal that the country’s threshold progressivity is quite low and
that, with a suitable tax and subsidy scheme, the government can raise the threshold above
the current progressivity. Afterwards, increased progressivity would not only lower in-
come inequality but also promote growth. Thus, the seeds of a policy conjecture for
￿growth with equity￿ spring up ironically from a positive growth-inequality relationship,
while a negative growth-inequality relationship may lure politicians, unaware of these
effects, to promote unwittingly a policy of redistribution.
All our results stand or fall on the "missing credit market" assumption. In the presence
of a complete credit market, increased heterogeneity could be traded away with borrow-
ing and lending to foster growth, and a redistributive policy would lose its utility in the
absence of any interpersonal differences in productivity. Consequently, we should always
expect, in this case, to ￿nd a positive growth-inequality relationship. If we relax any of
the other assumptions, the magnitude of the growth-inequality correlations would change
but their sign would not. For example, if we allow a perfectly competitive market where
a ￿rm’s TFP inversely varies with the variance of the ef￿ciency of labor, an increase in
the variance of ef￿ciency will increase income inequality but decrease growth, implying
a negative growth-inequality relationship, similar to what we ￿nd in our model economy.
Similarly, a greater progressivity in a competitive environment can create macroeconomic
bene￿t by lowering income inequality and, thereby, raising TFP; but, if the progressiv-
ity is suf￿ciently high, the microeconomic incentive costs of raising progressivity may
outweigh that bene￿t, implying a positive growth-inequality relationship. Consequently,
by allowing a competitive environment but by maintaining the "missing credit market
assumption", we can reproduce our result with a clear economic intuition.
30For future work, it could be a worthwhile exercise to continue the spirit of our analysis
by designing more quantitative experiments to interpret the history of events associated
with different channels through which a growth-inequality relationship emerges. Some of
those channels are explicitly identi￿ed in this paper. Some remain unexplored but could
be very easily pursued by exploiting a number of explicitly derived analytical expres-
sions, including the key equation of this paper that provides relatively broad characteri-
zation of the growth-inequality dynamics. For example, an unexplored avenue for tracing
the growth-inequality relationship would be to examine the quantitative signi￿cance of
shocks to the degree of knowledge spillover. It could be argued that the extent of this
spillover effect varies signi￿cantly between countries with or without modern ￿communi-
cation highways￿. Also, in the process of development, this spillover effect may increase
or decrease depending on economic policies related to choice of institutions. By changing
the externality parameter in our key equation, we get ambiguous growth-inequality rela-
tionships depending upon the context of the model economy to be identi￿ed by the other
parameters. Consequently, an interesting question for future research would be to ask
whether different realizations of growth-inequality relationships, across countries or over
time, could be signi￿cantly governed by the extent of knowledge spillover. We provide
an explicit algorithm involving knowledge spillover in our paper for making conditional
conjectures about that possibility. The task we leave for future research is to ￿nd a his-
torically relevant context, and to design quantitative experiments based on that context to
explore those conjectures further.
By presenting a theoretical framework, the ￿ndings in this paper also build an alterna-
tive foundation for future empirical research. Our ￿ndings suggest that paying attention
to speci￿c events that may have a signi￿cant impact on the data, and understanding the
theoretical channel that spells out the impact within a general theoretical framework like
ours, may be necessary to overcome the serious concerns expressed in Banerjee and Du￿o
(2003) about the current state of empirical research involving growth-inequality relation-
ships.
Appendix




t + N2 lnki
t + Bt. Then, by substituting this value function, (2), (4) and (5) into
(9), the ￿rst-order conditions with respect to the savings and labor supply imply Lemma
1. ￿
PROOF OF LEMMA 2: By assumption, at the initial date t = 0, physical and
human capital are lognormally distributed. By (13) and (14), it follows that ki
t and hi
t
remain lognormally distributed over time and hence by (1) yi
t is lognormal. Then, by the


























. Therefore, following Benabou (2002) we de￿ne
for each date t an index of income inequality ￿t as the logarithm of the ratio of mean to
median income. Thus the inequality index (15) is proved. By (5), we can get (16). The
proof of Lemma 2 is completed. ￿
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: Equations (17) and (19) show that the coef￿cients on
mkt and mht can be represented by a 2 ￿ 2 matrix with an eigenvalue equal to one if
(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿￿ = 0. It implies that both mkt and mht will go to in￿nity and
grow at a constant growth rate in the long run.
Substituting (13) and (14) into (1) yields the equilibrium path of income for agent i.







































































+ ￿ln￿t + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)lne


































By the de￿nition of ￿t we can get:









32Integrating (4), and by (6) and (12), we get:
(A.6) lnkt = ln￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) + lnyt￿1.
Substituting (16), (A.5) and (A.6) into (A.4), and rearranging, we can get (23). ￿
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: By equations (18), (20) and (21), we ￿nd that
the coef￿cients on ￿2
kt, ￿2
ht and covt can be represented by a 3 ￿ 3 matrix. Moreover,
the eigenvalues of the matrix are positive and less than one. It then implies that ￿2
kt,
￿2
ht and covt will monotonically converge to a unique steady state.14 Thus, the proof of
Proposition 1 is completed. ￿
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